Quantitative Assessment of Safety Integrity Level of Message Transmission Between Safety-Related Equipment by Rástočný, Karol et al.
Computing and Informatics, Vol. 33, 2014, 343–368
QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF SAFETY
INTEGRITY LEVEL OF MESSAGE TRANSMISSION
BETWEEN SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT
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Abstract. This paper describes and analyses the possibilities of a quantitative as-
sessment of message transmission between safety-related equipment for control and
communication systems with a guarantee of a higher safety integrity level (SIL). The
theoretical methods and standards recommended for industrial safety-related con-
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trol, information and communication systems with SIL3 are described. The main
part of the contribution covers theoretical methods and practical procedures used
within a safety analysis of safety-related message transmission with the requirement
of SIL4 for the area of railway interlocking systems. The theoretical analysis of these
methods is compared with the knowledge and experience the authors gained within
several safety verifications of such systems in practice in Slovakia as well as abroad.
Also, based on a case study in the mentioned application area, the authors proposed
their own quantitative mathematical model for assessing the safety integrity level
of message transmission within a closed transmission system with the failure tree
analysis (FTA) and Markov’s analysis (MA). The designed model, which evaluates
the effect of electromagnetic interferences (EMI) and random hardware failures of
a safety-related communication system (SRComS) to its safety, was realised and
verified. The verification in available conditions confirmed the contribution of the
model to the process of objectification of the safety assessment of message trans-
mission via SRComS.
Keywords: Safety-related systems and equipment, interlocking systems, transmis-
sion of safety-related messages, safety integrity level, safety assessment, safety code
Mathematics Subject Classification 2010: 60J27 (Continuous-time Markov
processes on discrete state spaces)
1 INTRODUCTION
During the process of developing a safety-related control system (SRCS), the fact
that the realisation of required safety functions is connected with message transmis-
sion inside the SRCS and with message transmission between the considered control
system and co-operating systems or equipment must not be forgotten. Because of
this, the safety of the applied communications, the so-called communication safety,
which might affect RAMS (Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, Safety) param-
eters significantly, has to be considered. In general, communication safety may be
characterised as the ability of a communication to assure:
• confidentiality of transmitted messages (only authorised objects/subjects have
access to the transmitted messages);
• integrity of transmitted messages (the transmitted messages can only be modi-
fied by authorised subjects and the origin of each message is verifiable);
• availability of transmitted messages (the transmitted messages are accessible by
authorised objects/subjects for a certain period of time).
The Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) communication technologies are not es-
sentially suitable (without additional technical safety measures) for transmission of
safety-related messages even though they include detection and correction methods
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for transmission assurance and other protective mechanisms, too. In terms of trans-
mission safety, such systems are described as non-safety-related. What types of
additional technical measures are needed to be applied to a COTS communication
system depends on the risk analysis results (analysis of attacks and their effects)
and the effect of the communication system to the required safety integrity level
(SIL) of the SRCS which comprises the communication system.
Nowadays, the number of vendors of safety-related communication technologies
who guarantee not only standard communication, but also communication among
safety-related equipment in compliance with IEC 61508 [1] is increasing. For in-
dustrial communication systems, the standard IEC 61784-3 [2], which defines the
procedure of designing safety profiles with regards to preserving functional safety
for families of industrial networks used within measure and control systems on the
technological control level [3], is valid.
It is a fact that safety is becoming an inseparable part of not only the lowest
control levels, but also of the SCADA/HMI level [4, 5], and of the information
level of a distributed system control [6, 7], where the interconnection of safety and
security profiles as defined in IEC 61784-4 is concerned [8]. Over the last few years,
the additional safety profiles CPF (Communication Profile Families) CPF1 (Safety
Foundation Fieldbus), CPF2 (CIP Safety), CPF3 (ProfiSafe) and CPF16 (Open
Safety) have been certified for SIL3 applications.
In practice (e.g. in railway transport), applications of SRCSs which require that
message transmission is realised with SIL4 [9] can be seen. Since communication
systems with such a property are not standardly available on the market, vendors
of SRCSs with SIL4 incline to the development of their own safety-related com-
munication systems if necessary. For the area of railway applications, the norm
EN50159 [10], which includes general recommendations on how to proceed in the
development of a SRComS, is valid. It is necessary that a trustworthy demonstra-
tion of the required safety facilities of a SRComS is included in its development. In
the informative part of the norm [10], basic information on how to demonstrate the
safety facilities of a communication system is introduced. However, this information
is not always unambiguous, which creates space for a subjective approach to the
safety assessment.
2 GOALS OF THE CONTRIBUTION
In this paper, the authors set their goal to be a comparison of the procedures used
for a safety assessment of a SRComS presented in the informative part of the norm
EN 50159 to their own method, based on which the model of a safety integrity
level assessment of message transmission in a closed transmission system was re-
alised. The authors’ method is based on theoretical procedures for identification
and quantitative evaluation of the factors effecting the transmission safety of data,
as well as on a theoretical calculation of the probability of the occurrence of an un-
detected corruption within a corrupted message. The practical calculations were
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realised for a specific SRComS used in railway applications and the obtained results
were confronted with the results produced by the procedures mentioned in the norm
EN50159. Achieving the main goal required the following particular tasks, which
will be analysed and described in the following chapters, to be dealt with:
• Identification of the risk factors and the mechanisms of their effect to the safety
of a considered SRComS.
• Quantitative evaluation of the parameters of the risk factors.
• Identification of protective measures and mechanisms of their effect to the safety
of a considered SRComS.
• Quantitative evaluation of the parameters of the protective measures.
• A realisation of a state model describing the transition from a reliable functional
state to a dangerous state.
• A verification (by a partial verification in available, real conditions) of the re-
alised model.
3 MODEL OF A SAFETY-RELATED COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
The considerations present in this paper are linked to the simple model of a SRComS
shown in Figure 1. The SRComS consists of safety- related equipment (SRE1) and
(SRE2), interfaces (INT) located on the boundary between SRE and a non-safety-
related transmission system, and the non-safety-related transmission system itself.
The equipments SRE1 and SRE2 contain an additional safety layer which safeguards
the safety-related functions of transmission and also contains a safety coder (SC)
and a safety decoder (SD). The safety layer is an extension of the transmission
system layers (transmission sender/transmission receiver). On the level of the link
layer, a transmission coder (TC) and a transmission decoder (TD) are components of
the safety layer. A safety-related message generated from the safety message source
(part SRE1) is transferred across a communication channel (transmission media) and
received in the safety message sink (part SRE2), whose task is to detect corrupted
messages and to react appropriately to failures in transmission. The transferred
messages are (or may be) affected by EMI (caused by noises, interferences or the
fading effect) and failures of the SRComS, too.
During a transmission of safety-related messages, the following type of commu-




• re-sequences of a message;
• delay of a message;
• masquerade of a message.












































   
   
   
   
   
   





















































































Figure 1. Model of a SRComS with a safety layer
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At the receiver’s side, the correctness of a transmitted message is evaluated on
two levels. The correctness of a transmitted message is standardly evaluated by the
decoder of the transmission code in a non-safety-related transmission system on the
first level, and by the decoder of the safety code on the second level. The decoder
of the safety code is a part of SRE2 and is realised on multiple channels [11] (in
Figure 2, a two-channel decoding via decoders of the safety codes DSR and DSL is
shown). Consequently, if the decoder of the transmission code interprets an incoming
message as correct, the message from the decoder of the transmission code (still
secured by the safety code) is sent to both the decoder DSR and the decoder DSL.
These two decoders independently evaluate the correctness of the incoming message
(and the correctness of application data too). The received message is considered to
be correct if both of the decoders produce identical results. The comparison of the
results from the decoders is a part of the safety mechanisms within SRE2. If both of
the decoders produce the result that the received message may be considered to be
correct, the received data is provided for further processing in each channel; if one
of the decoders evaluates the received message as incorrect, the message is rejected
and a safety procedure is called. Such a solution enables the required safety level in








Dekoder SK                      
(DSR)
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Figure 2. Block scheme of a SRComS – part located in SRE2
4 RISK FACTORS AFFECTING THE SAFETY INTEGRITY
OF A SAFETY-RELATED COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
Failures of safety-related communication systems belong to the most important risk
factors which affect the safety integrity of a system. Such failures can lead to a loss
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of operational capability and can result in a health risk, life danger, environmental
hazard or cause large substantial damage.
Detailed specifications of these failures and their interpretations are introduced
e.g. in [12]. The causes of a corruption in a transmitted message can be SRComS
(its failures). In this case, mainly the following has to be considered:
• systematic failures, which may be caused primarily by failures in the SRComS
development, or by failures caused by insufficient maintenance of the SRComS;
• HW failures of the SRComS;
• the operational environment; in this case, mainly electromagnetic influences
(EMI: noise, interference, fading) need to be considered.
From a quantitative evaluation of the safety integrity from SRComS point of
view, it is necessary to be concerned only with failures that can be evaluated quan-
titatively, namely the following:
• random hardware failures;
• failures caused by the operational environment.
The effect of systematic failures on the safety integrity of a SRComS cannot
be evaluated quantitatively because mathematical modelling of the occurrence of
systematic failures is very problematic since it requires to know the type of the
distribution of the systematic failures and the parameters of this distribution [13].
It can only be evaluated qualitatively, mainly by tests and demonstrations of suit-
able measures applied to prevent failures and errors on both the hardware and the
software level.
4.1 Random Failures of SRComS Hardware
Since a SRComS is an electronic system, it is justifiable to assume that the occur-
rence of random failures of a SRComS can be described by the exponential prob-
ability distribution. From a safety assessment point of view, a SRComS may be
decomposed to the following parts (see Figure 1):
• The part of a transmitter that is a component of SRE1. This is a non-safety-
related part of a SRComS because SRE1 is fully responsible for the correctness of
generated messages. SRE1 is designed according to the procedures in compliance
with SIL4 as defined in [10].
• The part of the circuits of the transmission system, consisting of the interface
between SRE1, the transmitter of a non-safety-related transmission system, the
hardware of the communication channel and the receiver of a non-safety-related
transmission system, and of a part of the circuits of the transmission code de-
coder. This part basically covers the parts of a non-safety-related transmis-
sion system whose failures result in corrupting a transmitted message (analogy
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to corrupting a transmitted message by EMI). The failure rate of this part of
a SRComS is later referred to as RTS.
• The circuits of the transmission code decoder – the part of the decoder’s circuits
of the transmission code which take part in decoding the received message and
in transmitting the decoded SRE2 message (without the redundant part of the
transmission code). A failure of these circuits may cause an occurrence of a cor-
rupted message at the entry of SRE2. The corruption may be caused either by
the transmission of the message or by the processing within the circuits of the
transmission code decoder. The failure rate of this part of a SRComS is later
referred to as RDT .
• The circuits of the safety code decoder – part of the circuits within SRE2 (see
Figure 2). SRE2 is designed according to the procedures corresponding with
SIL4, and its circuits (including the circuits of the safety code decoder) comply
with the safety assessment as defined in [10]. In this case, the dangerous failure
rate of a decoder of a safety code can be directly considered and expressed by
the equation:
RHDS = 2RDSL ·RDSR · TS, (1)
where RHDS is the dangerous failure rate of the decoder of the safety code, RDSL
is the failure rate of the decoder of the safety code in the left channel, RDSR is
the failure rate of the decoder of the safety code in the right channel and TS is
the time of the tolerance of receiving the corrupted message by the safety-related
part of a transmission system.
4.2 Failures Caused by the Effect of the Operational Environment
Since safety-related messages are transmitted over a real communication channel,
it is necessary to expect the effect of the noise or interference pattern to transmit-
ted messages, which has significant impact to the frequency of corrupted messages.
Electromagnetic interference is a result of a wide range of various influences which
are indescribable deterministically. Therefore the models of communication channels
are also based on probabilistic characteristics. For the safety analysis of communi-
cations based on binary transmission, the norm [10] recommends using the model of
a binary symmetric channel (BSC) for the bit error rate of a communication channel
from the interval 〈0; 0.5〉. This model assumes that the errors occurred during binary
transmissions are random and independent. If the BSC model is used for transmis-
sion of binary messages with the bit error rate pe, the probability of a message of
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5 SAFETY MECHANISMS AND THEIR PARAMETERS
The protection against undesirable consequences of EMI is using a safety code from
the group of channel codes. Because of the possibility of the failure masking effect,
utilisation of the correction abilities of channel codes in a SRComS is not recom-
mended for railway applications at all. It is recommended to apply detection block
(n, k) codes or correcting codes with a modified decoding algorithm, which is fi-
nished by the process of message detection (n is length of code word, k is length of
the information part of code word). Simple random errors in a SRComS are usually
detected within a non-safety-related transmission system with a transmission code.
If an error is detected by the safety code, there are usually more corrupted bits in
a safety-related message.
5.1 Transmission Code
Even though only safety mechanisms located within the safety layer are relevantly
important from a safety point of view, the check mechanisms used in the standard
layer of non-safety-related transmission are significant for increasing the safety of
a SRComS. The transmission code is part of these mechanisms too. In COTS tech-
nology, the transmission code often uses cyclic code working on the principle of
CRC (Cyclic Redundancy Check). Especially when using cyclic code, the selection
of the generator polynomial required special attention. The selection of the gener-
ator polynomial of cyclic code should be effected by the error patterns that occur
in the considered connection most frequently. In safety-related applications, the in-
dependence of a transmission and a safety code is required, which for a safety code
based on CRC means the inability to use commonly standardised types of generator
polynomials within the COTS systems. It is also necessary to note that the most
commonly used detection code in practice does not detect a negation of a message
nor corrupted messages with all bits having the value of logical 1 or all bits having
the value of logical 0.
5.2 Safety Code
A safety code with a broad detection coverage and a quick detecting algorithm is
fundamental for safety-related applications. The requirements for the selection of
parameters of a safety code depend on the required safety characteristics of a SR-
ComS (especially on the rate or the probability of an undetected error). If both
safety-related and non-safety-related messages are transmitted via a SRComS, then
they have to have different structures.
The following practical problems need to be solved during the selection of the
parameters of a safety code:
• Length of the code – it is usually required that a single code can be used for
messages with different lengths, while most of the theoretical information on
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codes is connected with specific recommended construction lengths of codes,
which is not generally observed in practice (shortened or extended codes are
used). It is necessary to note that codes of different lengths have different safety
characteristic.
• Redundancy of a code – the dominant opinion is that the more the redundant
bits, the higher the safety. The requirement for a higher number of redundant
bits is not always justifiable (e.g. CRC-64 – ISO with 64 redundant bits has worse
detection properties than a well-chosen code with 32 redundant bits) [14, 15].
• Minimum Hamming distance – dmin is bound to the requirement that the code
needs to detect errors with a certain maximum length most of the codes detect
simple (independent errors) as well as j-multiple errors (dependent errors –
bursts). In practical application, the dmin of a code is not always known. If
it is, then it is valid for a code of a given construction length. If the length
is shortened, dmin can sharply decrease. To calculate dmin, Gilbert-Varshamov
bound [16] can be used.
• Detection of selected error patterns – some types of errors can occur frequently
and therefore it is required of a code to detect them (e.g. repeated bursts of
a certain length, all logical 1 bits, all logical 0 bits, negation of a message).
However, the probability of the occurrence of error patterns is usually unknown.
5.3 Determination of the Probability of an Undetected Error
According to [10], the determination of the probability of an undetected error of
a code pU in a model of a BSC is obligatory. It is necessary to prove that the
required value of pU is valid for every length of safety-related messages. The prob-
ability of an undetected error pU with applying linear binary block (n, k) codes ex-
presses the event that the message (code word of length n) was sending and another
message is receiving. It must be noted that the majority of methods of calculat-
ing pU is connected with a certain class or group of codes (e.g. Hamming codes,
Reed-Solomon codes) for which a quantitative analysis of a failure of a decoder is
valid only for very simplified conditions, which is not entirely usable for practical
applications.
To calculate pU , the basic characteristic of the communication channel, the bit
error rate pe must be known. In practice, in most cases it is not possible to find
the value of pe by measuring and the statistical values of pe known for certain
communication channels have to be relied on. However, these values do not always
characterise a specific application.
For all groups of linear binary block codes in a BSC model, the probability of






Ani pe(1− pe)n−i, (3)
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where dmin is the minimal Hamming distance of the code, A
n
i is the weighted dis-
tribution of the binary (n, k) code, pe is the bit error rate of the communication
channel, i is the integral part of dmin+1
2
and n is length of code word.
In order to calculate pU according to (3), it is necessary to know the dmin of
a code, even though in some sources, the bottom bound in the Equation (3) is
i = 1. The vector of the weighted distribution of the binary (n, k) code needs to
be calculated, too. For calculation of the weighted distribution, it is necessary to
know the weighted polynomial Pw(x, n,A
n









Nowadays, the following approaches to calculating the weighted distribution of
binary Ani codes (n, k) are known:
• A direct calculation of the weighting distribution – it is needed to gradually
generate all code words with a generator matrix or a generator polynomial.
However, this approach is time-consuming for long code words and therefore
unusable for real-time safety-related message transmission.
• The determination of the weighted distribution with the MacWilliams identity –
based on the fact that every linear binary (n, k) code – can be converted to a dual
code for which there is the Equation (5) between Pw(x, n,A
n
i ) of the primary
binary code and Pw(x, n,B
n













The advantage of this calculation method is that the dual code has much fewer
code words than the primary code and the calculation of the weighted distribu-
tion is faster and easier. It should not be forgotten that for some linear binary
(or character) block codes, their weighting functions are known but are only
applicable for the constructive length of the codes n, which is not usually ob-
served in practical applications. As an example, the weighted function of perfect







(1 + x)n + n(1 + x)(n−1)/2 · (1− x)(n+1)/2
]
. (6)
For cyclic codes, working on the CRC principle can be used within the weighting
distribution of the dual code procedures, which are described e.g. in [17] for the
primitive generation polynomial g(x) or for the polynomial g(x), which is the
product of the several irreducible polynomials. Such an approach is described
as a method of two LFSR (Linear Feedback Shift Register) [18].
The above approach for calculating the probability of an undetected error can
be simplified, if Ani in Equation (3) is approximated according to Equation (7),
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which on the one hand brings larger deviation into the safety analysis, which
can be caused by an unnecessary increase of the required redundant elements






















If the product n · pe is much smaller than (n · pe  1), the sum in Equation (8)








pdmine (1− pe)n−dmin . (9)
The calculation of a rough estimate of the probability of an undetected error is
obtained with the assumption of the value of the bit error rate pe = 1/2 as (10),
















· 2k−1 = 2n−k = 2−r. (10)
However, this is described as the most pessimistic estimation of the probability of
an undetected message. This upper bound is not dependent on neither the weighted
distribution nor the length of a code word n.
It must be noted that the value 2−r does not need to be a maximum for different
values of pe. Therefore it is required to prove that on the interval 〈0; 0,5〉 for the
probability of an undetected error, the following holds: pU < 2
−(n−k).
Then according to [10], the safety code called “good code” is used.
Nowadays, new fast and effective methods for the calculation of the weighted
distribution and the probability of an undetected error in a BSC model on the
interval 〈0; 0,5〉 are searched for [18].
5.4 Determination of the Failure Rate Caused by the Effect of EMI
Undetected errors caused by a corruption of a message integrity due to EMI during
transmission occur in the case of a failure of both channel coders: the transmission
coder (in a non-safety-related transmission system) and the safety coder (in the
safety layer). If we know the probabilities of an undetected error of the transmis-
sion and safety codes, then the failure rate caused by the EMI effect RHEMI can be
expressed as:
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RHEMI = pUT · pUS · fEMI , (11)
where pUT is the probability of an undetected error of the transmission code, pUS is
the probability of an undetected error of the safety code and fEMI is the frequency
of occurrences of corrupted messages caused by EMI per hour.
If a transmission system does not contain a channel coder/decoder of a trans-
mission code, then pUT = 1.
For the calculation of the probability of an undetected error of the transmission
and the safety codes, some of the formulas defined by Equations (3), (8), (9) or (10)
can be used. It is necessary to note that for the probability of an undetected error
of the safety code, according to [10], it is necessary to verify that the function pUS is
monotonous on the interval 〈0; 0, 5〉, which involves a complex computation problem
for long messages [19]. If function pUS satisfies the requirement, the safety code has
the “proper code” attribute. Proper codes are always “good”, but good codes are
not always proper [10].
The frequency of the occurrence of an incorrect message per hour can be easily
determined for cyclic message transmission. In other cases, it is necessary to im-
plement a counter of corrupted messages, or the value of fEMI is estimated, or the
worst case is used (i.e. all generated messages from the source are corrupted).
In practice, in railway interlocking systems if a corrupted message is received, the
receiver of SRE has to react by going to a predefined safe state (message is regarded
as invalid and is ignored). In order to meet the requirement of availability of the
systems, there is a set limit of corrupted messages within all received messages per
a defined time interval and only having reached the limit, certain technical measures
will take place to guarantee the required safety level of transmitted messages (e.g.
a decrease of the transmission rate or a permanent interruption of message trans-
mission). The specified calculation of the tolerance value of corrupted messages per
a certain time interval depends on the error rate of the used communication channel.
Within the safety assessments, the probability of l consecutive corrupted messages
can be determined by Bernoulli’s law (Equation (12)), where the number of observed
independent results of an event v denotes the number of generated safety-related





· plm · (1− pm)v−l. (12)
6 REALISATION OF MODELS OF SAFETY-RELATED
COMMUNICATION SYSTEM
Within the safety analysis of a SRComS (illustrated in Figure 1), two stages were
important: creating the model and substituting real data to the model. It was
necessary to create a model that could simulate the effect of several simultaneous
factors effecting the safety of a SRComS. Since the occurrence of corrupted messages
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can be considered to be a Markov process, the authors of this paper decided to use
a Markov model based on a CTMC (Continuous Time Markov Chain) for modelling
the safety of a SRComS (the probability or the failure rate of an undetected cor-
rupted message). Markov chain models are efficient tools for representing stochastic
discrete event processes with wide applications in decision and control. A novel
approach to fuzzy-Petri-net reasoning generated solution to initial or another state
in Markov-chain models is proposed e.g. in [20].
A very important step of creating a final version of the model was identification
of hazards (events) that can cause a failure of detecting a corruption of a message.
The identification of these hazards was realised with a fault tree model.
In order to create a model that recognises the effects of individual factors effect-
ing the safety of a SRComS, and a concrete evaluation of the model’s transitions,
it is necessary to clearly know the properties of the SRComS and its behaviour in
various operational situations. This means a model that could be used for different
SRComSs cannot be created. However, it is a fact that essentially the basics of
models are always equivalent.
Since a SRComS has to work in all operational situations and guarantee the
required SIL, while modelling the monitored safety parameters, it is necessary to
suppose the worst situations that can occur in operation. This means that with
a SRComS, it must be assumed that all transmitted messages are corrupted because
of either EMI or a failure of its HW. Besides, it is needed to count with the failure
of individual safety measures of a SRComS.
6.1 Realisation of the Fault Tree Model of SRComS
A fault tree model of the SRComS (Figure 3) that illustrates which basic events
or combinations thereof can create an undesirable (top) event being an undetected
corruption message of SRComS (Figure 1) was made. The term “undetected cor-
rupted message” denotes the situation when a transmitted message is considered
to be correct (without errors) even though it became corrupted (transmission data
was changed) during its transmission. From the point of a quantitative assessment
of safety integrity, it is required to calculate the probability of the occurrence of
an undesirable (top) event. Since basic events must be considered to be indepen-
dent, a simple logic function (Boolean function) can describe the relations between
a top event and basic events. If the probabilities of the occurrences of basic events
are known, then this is regarded as a simple matter from a mathematical point of
view.
Even though the fault tree in Figure 3 is clear and very easy to design, it is not
crucially important from the point of view of quantitative assessment of the safety
integrity of a SRComS, because it is unable to consider changes of the operational
state of a SRComS that occurred as a consequence of safety measures (for example
a change of the transmission rate, a repetition of a message, etc.).
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Figure 3. Fault tree of a SRComS
6.2 Safety Assessment of SRComS Using Realised Markov Models
A Markov model is more flexible than a fault tree and is able to count with the
effect of several factors to the safety integrity of a SRComS. In Figure 4, a CTMC
is illustrated. This chain describes the transitions of the SRComS (presented in
Figure 1) from a functional, safe state (state 1) to a dangerous state (state 8). In
addition to state 8, the diagram has one more absorption state (state 7) that is
not primarily dangerous for a controlled process. A SRComS gets into this state
if the safety mechanisms decide that continuing data transmission is inadequate
from a safety point of view, and the data transmission is needed to be interrupted
indefinitely (only operator can restart the transmission again). To make Figure 4
more readable, the transitions into state 8 (transitions done by the safety measures
of the SRComS) are illustrated by dashed lines.
Each symbol used in Figure 4 is defined in Table 1. The characteristics of each
state and transition in Figure 4 is described in Tables 2 and 3.
The diagram in Figure 4 can be described by a set of differential equations and
a vector of the initial probabilities (13).
To solve the set of differential equations defined by Equations (13) and (14), the
SW tool Wolfram Mathematica was used.
Since according to [10] the SIL of a SRComS can be evaluated as the rate of
undetected a corrupted message, it is suitable to know overall failure rate of the
SRComS transmission from state 1 to state 8 in Figure 4.
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Symbol Meaning
RTS HW failure rate of the transmission system part (the transmitter, the com-
munication channel and parts of the receiver).
RDT HW failure rate of the decoder of the transmission code.
RDS HW failure rate of the decoder of the safety code.
pUT Probability of an undetected error of the transmission code.
pUS Probability of an undetected error of the safety code.
f Frequency of generated messages by the transmitter.
fEMI Frequency of corrupted messages caused by EMI.
fHTP Frequency of corrupted messages caused by HW failures of the transmitter
part of the transmission system (the transmitter, the communication channel
and parts of the receiver).
fW Frequency of corrupted messages without distinguishing the source of the
corruption.
TT Tolerance time of receiving corrupted messages by the non-trusted part of
the transmission system.
TS Tolerance time of receiving corrupted messages by the trusted part of the
transmission system.
δT Intensity of the transition to the permanently safe state caused by the mech-
anism for checking the number of received (detected) corrupted messages by
the decoder of the transmission code.
δS Intensity of the transition to the permanently safe state caused by the mech-
anism for checking the number of received (detected) corrupted messages by
the decoder the safety code.
Table 1. Meaning of symbols
State Description
1 The transmission system is functional; EMI corrupted transmitted messages.
2 A transmission system state, in which the transmitter part of the transmission
system or a part of the communication channel have a failure.
3 A transmission system state, in which the decoder of the transmission code
has a failure.
4 A transmission system state, in which the decoder of the safety code has a fail-
ure.
5 A transmission system state, in which the transmitter part of the transmis-
sion system or a part of the communication channel and the decoder of the
transmission code have a failure.
6 A transmission system state, in which the transmitter part of the transmission
system or a part of the communication channel and the decoder of the safety
code have a failure.
7 Permanent interruption of transmission caused by safety mechanisms. A safe
state.
8 A dangerous state, in which a corrupted message was undetected.
Table 2. Description of the states in Figure 4








The transition is realised as a consequence of a HW fail-
ure of the transmitter part of the transmission system or




The transition is realised as a consequence of a HW fail-




The transition is realised as a consequence of a HW fail-
ure of the decoder of the safety code.
RDS
1→ 8 The transition is realised as a consequence of a message
being corrupted by EMI and insufficient detection abili-
ties of the transmission and safety codes.
fEMI · pUT · pUS
1→ 7
2→ 7
The transition is realised as a consequence of the opera-
tion of mechanisms for checking the number of detected
corrupted messages by a decoder of the transmission code
or the safety code.
δT + δS
2→ 8 The transition is realised if a transmitted message is cor-
rupted (as a consequence of the HW failure of the trans-
mitter part of the transmission system or a part of the
communication channel) and the transmission and safe
codes have insufficient detection abilities.
fW · pUT · pUS
3→ 7
5→ 7
The transition is realised as a consequence of the oper-
ation of the mechanisms for checking the number of de-





The transition is realised in consequence of the operation
of the mechanisms for checking the number of detected





The transition is realised if the transmitted message is
corrupted (by a HW failure) and the safe code has insuf-
ficient detection ability, or the decoder of the safety code
has a failure.
RDS + fW · pUS
4→ 8
6→ 8
The transition is realised if the transmitted message is
corrupted (by a HW failure) and the safe code has insuffi-
cient detection ability, or the decoder of the transmission
code has a failure.
RDT + fW · pUT
Table 3. Transitions in Figure 4
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Figure 4. Markov model of a SRComS
dp1(t)
dt
= −(RTS +RDT +RDS + fEMI · pUT · pUS + δT + δS) · p1(t);
dp2(t)
dt
= RTS · p1(t)− (RDT +RDS + fw · pUT · pUS + δT + δS) · p2(t);
dp3(t)
dt
= RDT · p1(t)− (RTS +RDS + fEMI · pUS + δS) · p3(t);
dp4(t)
dt
= RDS · p1(t)− (RTS +RDT + fEMI · pUT + δT ) · p4(t); (13)
dp5(t)
dt
= RDT · p2(t) +RTS · p3(t)− (RDS + fw · pUS + δS) · p5(t);
dp6(t)
dt
= RDS · p2(t) +RTS · p4(t)− (RDT + fw · pUT + δT ) · p6(t);
dp7(t)
dt
= (δT + δS)[p1(t) + p2(t)] + δS · [p3(t) + p5(t)] + δT · [p4(t) + p6(t)];
dp8(t)
dt
= pUT · pUS · [fEMI · p1(t) + fw · p2(t)] + (RDS + fEMI · pUS) · p3(t)
+ (RDT + fEMI · pUT ) · p4(t) + (RDS + fw · pUS) · p5(t)
+ (RDT + fw · pUT ) · p6(t).
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~p(0) = [p1(0), p2(0), p3(0), p4(0), p5(0), p6(0), p7(0), p8(0)] = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0].
(14)
According to [21] the rate of undetected corrupted message can be calculated








pA(t) = p7(t) + p8(t). (16)
It is possible to assume that the HW failure rate of the decoder of the safety code
RHDS  1 · 10−9 h−1 and therefore the following condition RHDS  RTS, RHDS  RDT
is met. Then the diagram illustrated in Figure 4 can be modified as shown in
Figure 5. Because of the mentioned requirements, states 4 and 6 are irrelevant in
the realised model, but remain in the model to keep it readable.
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fW.pUT.pUS 
  fEMI.pUT.pUS 
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Figure 5. Modified Markov model of the SRComS
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7 OBTAINED RESULTS AND THEIR VERIFICATION
The safety assessments of the SRComS illustrated in Figure 1 and described in
Section 6 were based on the worst assumptions, as the norm [10] requires, and the
transmission and safety codes were regarded as cyclic CRC block codes, namely
CRC-16 (transmission code) and CRC-32 (safety code).
Input parameters for the calculation of the safety indicators: the rate (or the
probability) of an undetected corruption in a message was determined based on the
assumption that the frequency of generated safety-related messages from SRE1 is
f = 72 000 h−1, i.e. the message transmission was assumed to be cyclic (cyclic time:
one message per 50 ms). To determine of the probability of an undetected error of
both codes, Equation (10) for the worst case of bit error rate of the communication
channel was used.
Additional input parameters for the safety assessment of the SRComS were
selected for a specific communication system used in railway transport [21]:
• HW failure rate of the transmitter part of the transmission system RTS = 5.3 ·
10−5 h−1;
• HW failure rate of the decoder of the safety code RDS = 5.3 · 10−5 h−1;
• Probability of an undetected error by the transmission code pUT = 2−16;
• Probability of an undetected error by the safety code pUS = 2−16.
During the safety assessment, the authors considered several operational situa-
tions. Let the SRComS have no safety measures for granting the safety integrity of
message transmission except the transmission and safety codes. This means that if
the decoders of the transmission or the safety code detect a corrupted message in
the process of receiving, the corrupted message is rejected but no additional safety
measures take place. If it is assumed that all received messages are corrupted (e.g.
as a consequence of random HW failures), then from a safety point of view it is the
worst case, i.e.
fW = fEMI = f = 72 000 h
−1, δT = δS = 0 h
−1. (17)
In Figure 6, the graphical relations of the probability and the rate of an occur-
rence of an undetected corrupted message for the model described in Figure 5 are
illustrated.
The relations given in Figure 6 imply that during the lifetime of the SRComS
(approximately 20 years), the rate of an undetected corrupted message will only be
on SIL1.
It is a fact that this is an operationally unrealistic case, because the decoder of
the safety code is a component of SRE2 and is realised with two channels with a com-
parison of the decoding results. Therefore in further considerations it is assumed
that all transmitted messages are corrupted and if the decoder of the safety code
detects that a received message is corrupted, then the received message is rejected
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Figure 6. The probability and the rate of an occurrence of an undetected corrupted mes-
sage with the parameters fW = 72 000 h
−1 a δT = δS = 0 h
−1
and the transmission interrupted indefinitely. If the decoder of the transmission
code detects a corrupted message, then the received message is rejected, but no
additional safety measures are carried out, i.e.
fW = fEMI = f = 72 000 h
−1, δT = 0 h
−1, δS = 36 000 h
−1. (18)
In Figure 7, the graphical relations of the probability and the rate of an occur-
rence of an undetected corrupted message for the model described in Figure 5 and
parameter calculated in (18) are illustrated.
The graphical relations in Figure 7 imply that during the lifetime of the SRComS,
the rate of an undetected message occurrence will be RH < 3 · 10−10 h−1, which
markedly exceeds the requirement for SIL4.
If we assume that all transmitted messages are corrupted and the decoder of the
safety code detects that a received message is corrupted, then the message is rejected
and the transmission is interrupted indefinitely. If the decoder of the transmission
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Figure 7. The probability and the rate of an occurrence of an undetected corrupted mes-
sage with the parameters fW = 72 000 h
−1, δT = 0 h
−1 a δS = 36 000 h
−1
code detects three consecutive corrupted messages, not only the received messages
are rejected but the transmission is interrupted indefinitely too, i.e.
fW = fEMI = f = 72 000 h
−1, δT = 18 000 h
−1, δS = 36 000 h
−1. (19)
The calculation of the probability of receiving consecutive corrupted messages
was realised according to Equation (12). The results of modelling the operational
scenario according to the selected parameters in Equation (19) are illustrated in
Figure 8.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
During the verification of the results, the authors focused on the calculation of the
most important indicators of a SRComS’s safety – the rate (or the probability) of
dangerous failures of the SRComS, stemming from the requirement for SIL4, whose












pH  [-] 





0.00005 0.00010 0.00015 0.00020 0.00025 0.00030







t [ ] 







Figure 8. The probability and the rate of an occurrence of an undetected corrupted mes-
sage with the parameters fW = 72 000 h
−1, δT = 18 000 h
−1 a δS = 36 000 h
−1
quantitative proof is required in practice during the development of interlocking and
communication systems in railway applications.
The practical calculations were implemented for the particular SRComS, which
is used in railway applications and the results confirmed that the considered SRComS
meets the SIL4 requirements according to [10].
The designed model can be used for assessments of ordinary operational situ-
ations, too. In such a case, it is necessary to consider that transmitted messages
are only effected by EMI. However, to calculate the transition rate of the SRComS
to the safe state (state 7 in Figure 4 or Figure 5), it is needed to evaluate the
probability of an occurrence of l consecutive corrupted messages. If l consecutive
corrupted messages occur, the SRComS goes to the safe state (state 7 in Figure 4
or Figure 5), while the transition rate (the rate of an occurrence of an undetected
corrupted message) depend on the message length and on the bit error rate of the
communication channel. In practice, in most cases two formats (a short format,
usually with up to 2 bytes, and a long format, usually with up to 256 bytes) are
used for the length of safety-related messages. A verification of a model for the
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assessment of safety characteristics of a SRComS is very problematic and cannot
be realised by practical measuring (because of very small values of the probability
of an undetected corrupted message). A verification can only be carried out based
on opinions of experts in this area, or by a comparison of results obtained with
other models. The results obtained via suggested model correspond with the results
obtained by using the procedure described in the informative part of the norm [10],
which is simplified and cannot be applied mechanically within a safety assessment.
Against an advancement which is mentioned in the norm [10] the designed model
decreases the subjective effect of an assessor on the final result.
Currently, the authors are focusing on:
• additional verifications of the designed model;
• a modification of the model, so that it could take into consideration other mech-
anisms of quality control of the transmission part (different to those used in the
designed model);
• creating a model for a safety assessment of message transmission in open trans-
mission systems, where in addition to assessing the safety code, it is necessary
to evaluate the effect of a failure of the cryptography code [22].
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